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Burn links on Supabase: handling short-lived secrets and 2-digit codes

Edge Functions

Security

Database

Flutter

I've been building NO SUS (disclosure: it's my project, solo), a privacy toolkit for students on Flutter + Supabase. The part I think is actually useful to other Supabase folks is a tradeoff I had to make with burn-after-read links, so writing it up here, and I'd like to hear how others handle it.

Default path: the server can't read what it stores

A burn note or file is encrypted in the browser (AES-256), and the link looks like https://nosus.foo/#/burn/<uuid>?k=<key>&v=<iv>. Everything after # is the URL fragment, which browsers don't send over the network. So Postgres only ever sees the note id and ciphertext. The row is useless without the fragment, and it's deleted on first view.

The problem: people don't want to paste a 64-hex-char key

For a quick share in class ("open this, the code is 42") a short code is way nicer. But a 2-digit code obviously can't protect anything by itself: 100 possibilities.

What I ended up doing:

The 2 digits are never the credential. They always travel with an unguessable pairing link; the digits are just a check you read off the screen in front of you.
Only for single-target shares, the key is stored server-side while the code is valid, for up to 20 minutes, then deleted when the code is used or expires. Multi-file shares never send the key.
Every table has RLS enabled, on the assumption that the client can be fully compromised. The client doesn't talk to server-only services directly; the sensitive operations (redeeming a code, fetching a share) go through scoped edge functions.

The honest cost: during that window, anyone who breaches the server, or a legal order served in that window, could get that key. After the window, only ciphertext with no key is left. I say this in the FAQ instead of pretending the code path is zero-knowledge.

Same idea for opening your files on a borrowed PC

The other flow ("Go") lets you open your own saved files on a cyber-cafe or college-lab PC without signing Google in there: scan a QR with the phone app, match a 2-digit code, approve with fingerprint or face. The phone keeps the Google token. After the hello the session is AES-256-GCM, Supabase just relays ciphertext and stores a hash of the session id. Sessions cap at 60 minutes. Downloads or prints on that PC can still stay there, and no protocol fixes that.

How to help

Shubham sahu discusses implementing a privacy toolkit using Supabase and Flutter, focusing on burn-after-read links. The approach involves storing encryption keys server-side temporarily for single-target shares, protected by a 2-digit code, and using edge functions with RLS for security. Shubham seeks advice on managing short-lived secrets and handling concurrent redeem requests.

Help on GitHub

Replies (1)

Update from me (I built NO SUS), 29 Sep 2026. A few things in the post above are out of date, and I can't edit the post body from here, so correcting them in this comment:

The source isn't public anymore. NO SUS is closed source now, so the "Source (MIT...)" link at the bottom 404s and there's no repo to point at. The nosus.foo link still works if you want to try a burn note.
The pairing code is now on by default for every single note or file, not an option. That means the "default path" above isn't key-free on the server anymore. The direct link still carries the key in the URL fragment, but while the two-digit code is valid (20 minutes by default) the key is stored server-side too, and it's swept within about 10 minutes after the code is used or expires. Multi-file shares are still link-only with no code, so for those the server only ever holds ciphertext. Burn links also use app.nosus.foo now.
Minor: Go approval on the phone is the phone's screen lock, not specifically fingerprint or face.

Both questions still stand, and the concurrent-redeem one matters more now that every single share goes through the code path.

Shubham sahu·9/29/2026, 4:07:16 AM