This is an interesting direction. I’d separate baseline security/posture checks from behavioural anomaly detection, otherwise the signal could get noisy very quickly. Before the “agentic” layer, I’d detect deterministic issues such as: \* tables exposed without appropriate RLS; \* unusually permissive policy changes; \* public/open Storage buckets; \* auth configuration drift; \* spikes in failed authentication; \* unexpected use of privileged/service credentials; \* sudden schema or permission changes. Then I’d add behavioural baselines for things like query volume, connection patterns, row/byte growth, auth activity and unusual access by role. For the MCP interface specifically, I’d make it read-only by default, expose narrowly scoped tools instead of arbitrary SQL, avoid returning secrets/raw credentials to the model, and make every anomaly explainable: evidence, affected resource, confidence/severity and a suggested remediation. A useful feature could be an “investigation bundle” for each alert: what changed, when it changed, which role/user was involved, relevant policy/configuration state and the smallest safe diagnostic query. That would make the server much more useful for agents without turning the agent itself into a privileged database operator. Other features I’d consider later: RLS/policy drift, schema drift, bucket exposure changes, anomaly suppression/baselining, Slack/webhook alerts and an audit timeline. The main thing I’d optimise for is: high-confidence, actionable anomalies before adding lots of sophisticated detections.